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Under CPA § 237-a, it was the clear policy of the law to require
that jurisdictional objections be taken by motion without any
other objection being joined. The joinder of any other objection
constituted a waiver of the jurisdictional objection.
That is not the case under the CPLR. CPLR 3211(e) not
only permits merits grounds to be joined on motions alleging
lack of jurisdiction; it makes clear that if the movant should
ever raise those merits grounds by way of a motion to dismiss
under 3211, he would have to join them with the jurisdictional
objection being moved on; only one 3211 motion is allowed.
Taking the intendment of the CPLR from the foregoing, and
applying it to a post-judgment motion to vacate a judgment, it
would appear quite satisfactory under the CPLR to join merits
grounds with jurisdictional grounds on the muotion to vacate the
judgment.
It was the policy of CPA § 237-a which would have justified the statement made in the Alves case under prior law. But
the case was handed dowi under present law, whose policy, as
indicated above, is decidedly different.
The matter became academic in Alves because, on the merits
ground, the defendant prevailed. But the point is an important
one. A defendant should not be precluded from joining merits
grounds in a motion to vacate a judgment for lack of jurisdiction.
The joinder amounts, in effect, to an alternative request that
the default be vacated and the defendant permitted to defend on
the merits. It accomplishes nothing, and only creates unnecessary
delay and expense, to require the defendant first to make a
motion to vacate on jurisdictional grounds and then, if that is
denied, to make an entirely new motion to open the default (offering
excuses for it) and secure leave to defend on the merits.
to dismiss denied where a strong
Failure to prosecute -Motion
meritorious case is established.
The appellate division of the first department in a per curiam
opinion2 0 2 upheld the special term which denied a motion. to dismiss
for failure to prosecute. The delay in the instant case was three
years. The appellate division admitted that the excuses for delay
were "weak" but pointed out that the affidavits of merit set forth
facts which, if proven, "establish a meritorious case." In light
of this, it would not reverse the special term's "exercise of
discretion."
Despite Sortino v. Fisher,20 3 cited by the court and the
cases which followed it in which the appellate division granted
202

Friedman v. Fortgand, 21 App. Div. 2d 779, 250 N.Y.S.2d.862 (1st
Dep't 1964).
20320 Aipp. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).

cussion of Sortino, see 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 449 (1964).
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most of the motions to dismiss,20 1 the instant case reminds

practitioners that the coin is not entirely one-sided. The practitioner
should note the emphasis placed on the detailed statements in the
affidavits of merit which indicated a strong case on the petitioner's
behalf. The weight of the case's merits were such, held the court,
as to overcome the admittedly "weak" excuses for the delay in
prosecution.
Relevant to any motion to dismiss for neglect to prosecute is
the 1964 amendment of CPLR 3216. The amendment is extensively
treated in the May 1964 installment of the "Biannual Survey." 205
Rule 3211-Motion to dismiss searches the record.
In Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker,20 6 the trial court -granted
the wife's motion to dismiss affirmative defenses of the husband
in accordance with CPLR 3211(b). The appellate division, citing
CPLR 3211 (c), stated that the "motion to dismiss affirmative
defenses searches the record." 207 In reviewing the record, the
court declared that "the cause of action as presently pleaded is
defective," 20s and dismissed the case though defendant had not
cross-moved for such dismissal. The court, therefore, never had
to deal with the affirmative defenses.
This case illustrates an important aspect of. a motion to
dismiss. Upon such a motion, both. parties may submit, the
same proof to the court as would be periitted on a motion for
summary judgment. Under the CPLR, the court is expressly
empowered to treat
20 9 the 3211 motion to dismiss as a summary

judgment motion.
Rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Practice provided for a motion
to strike a defense. It further provided that if the court finds
on such a motion that the complaint does not state a cause of
action it may dismiss the complaint "even in the absence of a
crosp motion."

Rule 3211 lacks this explicit language. But rule 3212, the
summary judgment provision, has such language21 0 The statement
contained in 3211(c) permitting a 3211 motion to be treated as a
summary judgment motion would appear to be all the authority
needed to apply to a 3211 motion that part of 3212 which permits
the summary judgment motion to search the record.
2047B McKINNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 78 (1964).
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7 Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker, 21 App. Div. 2d 777, -, 250 N.Y.S.2d 979,
9802 3(1st Dep't 1964).
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CPLR 3211 (c).

See the last sentence of CPLR 3212 (b).

